We present and test a theory about the effects of political competition on the sources of economic growth. Using the Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) model of economic growth and data for around 80 countries, we show that political competition decreases the rate of physical capital accumulation and labor mobilization, but increases the rate of human capital accumulation and (less conclusively) the rate of productivity change. Our results suggest that political competition systematically affects the sources of growth, but those effects are crosscutting, explaining why democracy itself may be ambiguous. These findings help clarify the debate about regime type and economic performance and suggest new avenues for research.
Introduction
The literature about the political economy of economic growth has exploded over the past decade, as academics have churned out thousands of articles seeking to explain why some countries are rich and others poor. Despite a multitude of studies, the effect of democracy on economic performance remains a critically important, yet unresolved question.
1 As Przeworski and Limongi (1993) put it in their comprehensive literature review: despite a wide range of hypotheses about why democracy might be good or bad for growth and a plethora of quantitative studies, "we [still] do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders economic growth."
According to Przeworski and Limongi, eight of the 21 articles published on the subject between 1966-1992 found that democracies grow faster, eight found that authoritarian regimes grow faster, and five found no relationship at all. 2 To help resolve this question and explain why previous results are so contradictory, we alter the dependent variable. Rather than focusing on economic growth itself, defined as a rise in per capita income, we map political characteristics onto the sources of growth: factor capital accumulation (e.g., labor and capital), human capital accumulation, and productivity.
Framing the political economy of growth question in terms of the sources of growth helps us break the theoretical and empirical impasse that currently characterizes the literature.
Until recently, most efforts to examine the relationship between politics and economic performance have focused on growth as the dependent variable. The problem with this direct approach is that there are multiple sources of growth as Mokyr (1990) , Maddison (1987) , and
Mankiw, Romer and Weil indicate (1992) . If the same institution affects the sources differently, as our results suggest, then jumping from institutions to growth can be misleading. To overcome this problem, a few scholars have begun to examine how institutions affect the channels of 3 growth, including human capital and productivity (Lake and Baum 2001; Wacziarg 2001; Hall and Jones 1998; Przeworski et al. 2000) . Those papers suggest that democracy has a systematic effect on the pattern of economic performance-if not the rate of growth itself.
We extend this line of research by integrating the main model of political competitionthe median voter model-with the main model of economic growth-the augmented neoclassical model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) . Following North (1981) and Rodrik (2000) , our premise is that institutions are important because they structure the environment, providing economic agents different incentives to supply factors of production, to specialize and to innovate. The logic of the median voter model provides good theoretical reasons to believe that one political characteristic-the degree of political competition-has systematic effects on the different components of the augmented neo-classical growth model: capital and labor accumulation, human capital accumulation, and productivity growth. Whereas political competition ought to discourage physical capital and labor accumulation, it should encourage human capital accumulation and productivity gains. To test these propositions we use crosssectional time-series data for as many as 90 countries from five continents. The results provide support for these hypotheses: political competition decreases the rate of labor and capital accumulation, but it increases the rate of human capital accumulation and, more tentatively, technological innovation. Though the coefficients are small, especially in the cross-sectional dimension, the tests show a systematic relationship consistent with our predictions. In effect, regimes with more political competition may not grow any faster or slower than less competitive regimes but they grow differently, relying more on intensive as opposed to extensive growth, a point suggested (but not pursued) by Przeworski et. al. (2000) .
[Insert Figure 1 ] Before setting out our theory and elaborating our findings, it is important to clarify what we are not doing. We are not providing a comprehensive explanation for the individual sources of growth. Physical capital accumulation, for example, is clearly influenced by myriad factors, including the structure of the economy and the intellectual milieu of the day, while human capital accumulation is influenced by the income levels and ethnic diversity of society (Easterly and Levine 1997) . Nor are we trying to claim credit for the notion that political systems affect people's incentives to produce, invest, consume, and innovate-John Locke and Adam Smith, among others, beat us to the punch. Our goal is to systematically map political characteristics onto the key sources of economic growth, providing a theoretically coherent (albeit partial) explanation of the empirical record.
We begin with a brief literature review, looking first at the formal economic models and then at the political economy literature. We later present our tests and discuss the results.
Economic models of growth
Though the question of why some countries are rich and others poor is perhaps the question in political economy, there is no universally accepted model of economic growth. The workhorse model, devised by Solow (1956) , states that given additional factor inputs and decreasing returns to capital, poor economies will grow faster than rich ones until all economies converge at the same steady state. The Solow growth model remains a remarkable accomplishment, but it has several limitations: first, when developing countries are included in empirical testing, divergence rather than convergence seems to be the rule (Pritchett 1997) 
Political Economy
Given the desire to endogenize the sources of growth, an increasing number of scholars have incorporated political variables into their analysis, ranging from property rights to regime type (Buchanan et. al. 1980; North 1981; Wade 1990; Rodrik 1999) . The point of this literature is that many of the variables that affect growth are not structurally given, but reflect policy choices made by real people and real governments, rather than benevolent social planners. Whether people chose to supply factors of production, invest, and/or innovate depends largely on their incentives to do so.
In the end, much of the political economy literature boils down to a debate over regime type. Some people claim that the state needs to be insulated from redistributional forces found in democracies (Haggard 1990; Amsden 1995) . Others claim that democracies are better providers of public goods (Lake & Baum 2001 , 2003 , or a source of credibility because they limit the ability of state predation (North and Weingast 1989) . Proponents of the non-democracy perspective argue that democracy can retard growth because rulers are subject to short-term political pressures, particularly from distributional coalitions (Olson 1982) . Non-democracies, in contrast, may grow faster because secure rulers will have extended time horizons, allowing for astute planning. East Asia's "developmental" states are often cited in support of this hypothesis.
According to the stylized model, East Asia's "tigers" pursued successful industrial policies and promoted export-led industrialization, strategically promoting exports while limiting imports (Amsden 1995; Wade 1990 ).
In terms of economic growth, there are three problems with the developmental state story. First, it is not generalizable, suggesting that the assumption of benign state motivation is problematic. In fact, the picture that emerges from the large-N studies is that authoritarian regimes are not homogeneous (Alesina and Perotti 1994) . Some dictatorships have done exceptionally well in terms of growth, while most have done quite poorly. Democracies, on the other hand, appear to be relatively consistent, performing better than the average non-democracy but not as well as the best of them. Second, as Young (1995) pointed out, much of East Asia's growth can be traced to increased factor inputs, rather than increased efficiency as one would expect from a pure export story. Third, it is not clear that state intervention actually worked. Beason and Weinstein (1996) , for example, show that industrial policy in the paradigmatic development state, Japan, was disproportionately directed at low-growth sectors with decreasing 7 returns to scale. This does not mean that there is no East Asian miracle to explain, however.
What is missing from most accounts is an explanation for why East Asian savings and investment rates increased so substantially following World War II (Rodrik 1997) . Why did capitalists and workers supply their factor of production? How did governments, particularly authoritarian ones, overcome the credibility problem?
The view that democracy promotes growth is commonly associated with North and Weingast (1989) , who indicate that checks and balances within democracy serve as a form of credible commitment against predation, signaling to economic agents that their investments will be safe. North and Weingast's model of limited intervention fits well with economic theory about market development, but several objections can be raised. First, from a theoretical standpoint, it is not clear that democracies will provide more secure property rights. In historical perspective, democracy has been associated with insecure property rights, according to Przeworski and Limongi (1993) . In a more recent study, Clague, Knack, Keefer, and Olson (1999) found that there was no clear-cut relationship between property rights and democracy; long-standing regimes, democratic and non-democratic alike, afforded substantially better property rights protection than new regimes. Second, as Borner et. al. (1995) and Haber et al. (2003) show, there are multiple forms of establishing credibility, including openness and delegation of public authority to private agents. Finally, the empirical results are ambiguous, as noted by Sirowy and Inkeles (1991) , Przeworski and Limongi (1993) , and Barro (1996) .
The cross-cutting effects of political competition
What explains the empirical record? We theorize that one defining feature is the degree of political competition. As Olson (2000) points out, political competition fundamentally affects how governments manage the economy, thereby influencing the returns to productive versus non-productive activity for individuals. These returns, in turn, directly influence the propensity 8 of economic agents to supply factors of production (e.g., labor and capital), specialize and innovate, helping dictate the course of economic development.
There are a number of ways of thinking about how competition affects the incentives of various actors to engage in productive versus non-productive activity (e.g., rent-seeking).
Perhaps the most common argument, especially in the formal literature, is that political competition dissipates rents in the political market-just as in economic ones (Becker 1983) .
The general idea is that a ruler (party) in a non-competitive environment can offer subjects (voters) whatever economic policies the ruler desires, maximizing her own rents or those of privileged groups (McGuire and Olson 1996) . Citizens (voters) are effectively price takers, as their main option for preventing rent-seeking by rulers is to withdraw from production-an option that may not be available in the event of coercion. Without political competition, rulers can force citizens/subjects to supply at least part of their labor and capital, generating rents that can then be expropriated by the rulers or redistributed to favored groups. Absent some other form of incentives, however, rulers may not be able to persuade citizens to supply their brains, as creativity will be directed towards activities (non-economic in many cases), where rents cannot be expropriated.
In an environment where rulers must compete for subjects' allegiance, the opposite occurs. In order to retain power, rulers must provide benefits that subjects want, minimizing their opportunities to capture rents for themselves or other groups. As a result, political competition encourages politicians to compete away rents that benefit narrow groups. In practice, these rents could include tariff protection, restrictions on capital mobility, and other forms of potentially unproductive government intervention. The greater the competition facing rulers, the more government benefits should be directed towards representative/pivotal citizens 9 (the median voter in the standard case), and the less largesse rulers will have to bestow on favored groups. As a result, these groups will have fewer incentives to lobby for government favors. Instead they have incentives to engage in productive activities insofar as other citizens cannot expropriate the returns from those activities.
In practice, political competition could take a number of different forms, but the most common framework involves electoral competition, in which politicians or parties must compete for the support of the enfranchised via elections (Schumpeter 1941 (Alesina 1992; Dornbusch and Edwards 1991; and Gasiorowski 2000) . 3 More recently, rich democracies have learned to mitigate myopia through the creation of independent Central Banks, suggesting that political competition provides politicians with powerful incentives to solve their collective action problems-but such institutions have been relatively rare until the past decade. Nondemocratic leaders also have incentives to allocate budgets and credits to coalition partners, but without regular elections they have few incentives to engage in fiscal and/or monetary manipulations that they know will result in long-term ruin. Unless their time-horizons are shortened by immediate threats to survival, such as war, leaders in less competitive regimes have incentives to manage monetary and fiscal policy responsibly, especially if they are the residual claimants on output (Olson 1993). In short, there are several good theoretical reasons to believe that democracies will have lower investment levels.
Political competition could have a similar effect on labor supply, the second important source of growth. Unlike democracies, which have to rely largely on consent, less competitive regimes have the advantage of coercion, allowing them to repress labor organizations and 11 compel people to work. In fact, in the complete absence of political competition, rulers could effectively enslave large numbers of people, forcing them to work at below market wages, a situation that is by no means an historical anomaly. Less competitive regimes are also relatively insulated from distributive pressures, reducing the need for social welfare expenditures. In the absence of such guarantees, most people have incentives to enter the labor market and provide for themselves, increasing the supply of labor. In a competitive environment, in contrast, the median-voter has incentives to push for social programs that mitigate the vagaries of the market.
Social insurance, in turn, could reduce the difference between market returns and subsidized leisure, discouraging people from supplying their labor.
While political competition could discourage investment in physical capital for the aforementioned reasons, it should have the opposite effect on human capital. The same medianvoter model, for example, suggests that the electoral connection will provide politicians with incentives to supply public goods, especially education. 4 Assuming there is a universal demand for public education, the majority of citizens in competitive regimes can use the state to provide goods with positive externalities, such as schools and health care, raising the level of human capital and increasing the long-run growth rate.
More competitive regimes are also more likely to experience productivity increases for two reasons. The first reason is that political competition is likely to stimulate innovation and the diffusion of best practices (Wittman 1989) . In politically competitive regimes, the best ideas are more likely to filter their way through the political and economic system, eventually turning into policies and products. And as Mokyr (1990) notes, it is the application of information that is the wealth of nations. The second reason more competitive regimes might promote increases in total factor productivity (TFP) is that more competitive regimes are more likely to remove key 12 sources of rents, notably unproductive domestic regulation and tariff protection, while encouraging more productive forms of intervention, such as anti-trust regulation and/or consumer protection. Pro-market measures should increase the private returns to productive activities, encouraging the efficient use of resources and the production of new processes and procedures.
In sum, there are a number of theoretical reasons to believe that political competition may have a negative effect on physical capital accumulation and labor mobilization, but a positive effect on human capital accumulation and productivity. Hence, the general hypotheses that follow from our argument are the following:
Hypothesis 1 (H 1 ): More (less) competitive political regimes promote less (more) factor mobilization.
Hypothesis 2 (H 2 ):
More (less) competitive political regimes promote more (less) accumulation of human capital.
Hypothesis 3 (H 3 ):
More (less) competitive political regimes promote higher (lower) productivity.
To assess the plausibility of our argument in the following section we derive six working hypotheses from these general hypotheses. Next, we conduct a series of statistical tests on a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) panel of countries. The TSCS panel consists of 44-91 developed and developing countries over 20-38 years, depending on data availability for each dependent variable.
Research Design
This section discusses the operationalization of the general hypotheses, choice of variables, data sources, and specification of econometric models. indicating open competition for political leadership. 10 The one to five scale captures the idea of competition as a continuum and provides a finer level of discrimination that a simple democracy/dictatorship dichotomy-consistent with other findings that there is considerable variation within the categories of democracy and non-democracy.
It is worth noting, for example, that some East Asian dictatorships scored two or three on political competition during their non-democratic periods, not much lower than some Latin
American countries during their early democratic periods. Presumably, the reason for this is that some of the East Asian regimes allowed for some political participation, notably by business organizations, while some formally democratic Latin American countries had exceptionally restricted franchises. Most African dictatorships, in contrast, scored a 1, reflecting the fact that political space was largely monopolized by a small coterie of politicians. There is also large variance on the non-democratic side of the spectrum: Singapore, for instance, is coded as 2 (restricted) since its independence, while Congo is coded 1 (suppressed) for the period 1963-1990, 3 (factional) for 1992-1996 , and 2 from 1997 onwards.
11
As a robustness test, we supplement PARCOMP with other measures of democracy, described more in the endnotes. These measures include Polity 98 data about regime type (REGIME), which combines institutional and behavioral attributes of polities into a composite Free and Not-Free), which is derived from separate measures of political and civil liberties. 12 All of these measures have been subject to some criticism, especially Freedom House, which has a more substantive measure of democracy as opposed to a purely procedural one (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). 13 We prefer Polity 98 (especially PARCOMP) because it better captures the concept of political competition underlying our theory. The Polity and Vanhanen data have the added advantage that they are available for more years. These indices are highly correlated (see Table 7 ) and it turns out that the choice of independent variables only has a small impact on our results.
Control Variables
For each of the dependent variables in our analysis myriad specifications are possible. We decide to adopt a minimalist approach, using a limited number of control variables that would help stratify the data in a meaningful way. These variables are comparable across models and are theoretically coherent. In addition, diagnostic tests suggest that they belong in the model. We try to capture unit heterogeneity through fixed effects and time trends with year dummies; the former almost always belong, but not the latter.
14 Per capita income: To capture country wealth, the regressions include real GDP per capita, calculated via the chain method, or its natural log (LNRGDPCH). 15 The data are drawn from the Penn World Tables.
Gross Domestic Product:
To capture size of the market, we use real gross domestic product in billions of constant US dollars, calculated via the chain method (REALGDP). The natural of log of GDP (LNGDP) is also used in cases where it proved to be a better fit. The source for both is the PWT.
Population: As a control for country size, we use population in millions (POP_MIL) or its natural log (LNPOP). The source is the World Bank WDI 2001. 16 Trade to GDP: The measure is the same as above. Finding an adequate instrument for political competition is a daunting task. Valid instruments need to have high explanatory value and not be correlated with the disturbance term.
We decided to instrument the main explanatory variables with their lags. These are the best candidates on the first dimension (high explanatory power) and adequate on the second dimension (e.g., they are not contemporaneously correlated with the disturbance term).
24
Following conventional practice, the lagged dependent variable is also instrumented for by its lag.
Results
As detailed below, we find modest to strong support for most of the hypotheses we tested.
Controlling for a variety of factors (including income, population, openness, country size, national wealth, country characteristics and time trends), our results suggest that more competitive regimes invest less as a percentage of GDP and have lower levels of labor supply.
20
They also appear to use capital more efficiently and have higher levels of secondary school enrollment. Whether they are more integrated is an open question. More competitive regimes attract more FDI, but may not have higher levels of trade. The results we report are fairly robust to alternative specifications and to changes in the sample. The rub is that that the coefficients are relatively small in most cases, considerably less than a standard deviation across the entire sample. It is worth pointing out, however, that the variation within countries is typically less than the variation between countries, the measure used to calculate the standard deviation reported below.
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[Insert Table 1 [Insert Table 3] Human capital. Table 3 explores the relationship between political variables and enrollment in secondary enrollment, our proxy for human capital accumulation. In all of the models, the coefficients are the expected sign and significant at conventional levels. A one-point positive change in the political competition index, for example, is associated with a 1.14 percentage point increase in secondary enrollment. Going from the minimum level of political competition to the 22 maximum level would result in a 4.5 percentage point increase in secondary enrollment. This figure is also much less than a standard deviation in the sample (SD=28), but appears to be fairly close to the standard deviation for many individual countries. 27 The results also remain robust with year dummies, supporting the extant findings.
[Insert Table 4] Productivity. We could not directly test our conjecture about total factor productivity, but using proxies (investment efficiency, FDI, Trade) we find that there is some evidence that more competitive regimes use resources more efficiently. As reported in table 4, there is a positive relationship between the various measures of competition and the contribution of investment to growth. The coefficients are in the predicted direction and significant at conventional levels.
Controlling for investment levels, a one point increase in the level of political competition is associated with a 0.40 percent increase in the contribution of investment to growth. What this means in practical terms is not exactly clear since the transformations involved make it difficult to interpret the coefficient. In principle, however, it suggests that democracies obtain more growth per unit of capital invested. It is worth noting that the coefficients remain positive, but not significant with year dummies.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 ] Tables 5 and 6 show the relationship between the various measures of political competition and economic integration. Table 5 shows that the coefficient is positive and significant with FDI, even with year dummies, suggesting that more competitive regimes attract more FDI each period. A one-point increase in political competition is associated with a 0.25 percentage point increase in FDI as a percentage of GDP. Going from the minimum level of political competition to the maximum level would result in a 1 percent increase in FDI to GDP, about half a standard deviation in the sample. 
Comments and Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to show that political variables systematically affect the rate of physical and human capital accumulation, the supply of labor, and productivity-the building blocks of economic prosperity. Controlling for a variety of factors, we find that political competition has systematic, but cross-cutting effects on the sources of growth, lowering the rate of factor mobilization, while increasing the rate of human capital accumulation and (more tentatively) productivity. These findings are robust to a variety of specifications and with a number of control variables, including time trends and country specific characteristics.
Though the data offer support for our hypotheses, a number of caveats and comments are in order. First, the coefficients are relatively small, suggesting that political competition may not have much of an impact in the short-run. (When we use five-year intervals, instead of annual observations, the coefficients tend to be substantially larger, but the only plausible theoretical reason for this discrepancy is that the one-year lags of the dependent variable capture more of the variance than the five-year lags.) The best explanation may lie in the fact that economic growth is an incremental process, with nearly imperceptible short-run changes having considerable long-run effects. A small annual difference in secondary school enrollment rates may not look like much at any given moment in time, but the cumulative effect of a bettereducated workforce may translate into substantial income gains for the next generation. The same could be said for investment and productivity.
Second, the measures and econometric specification of the variables are less than ideal.
The fact is that each of these dependent variables could be (and has been) the subject of its own 24 paper. In order to keep the paper manageable, we have oversimplified the dependent variables, especially productivity, which is probably the most important source of growth for most countries in the past decades.
Third, our regressions do not control for a whole host of factors, notably the international environment. Confining the analysis to the nation-state level has the virtue of simplicity, but it excludes important interactions between the international system and individual states. It is certainly plausible that the diffusion of electoral competition may be driving global trends towards lower levels of physical capital accumulation and higher levels of human capital and productivity. Diffusion effects of this sort have clearly been shown to matter in terms of the spread of democracy (Gleditsch 2002; Ward et al. 1998 ). Presumably, they should matter for economic change as well.
Fourth, our analysis does not explore the question of whether there are important interactions between regime type, income level and performance. If it is true that factor accumulation is a more important source of growth for poor countries, while human capital and productivity are more important sources of growth for rich countries (because of diminishing marginal returns to factor accumulation), our results might help explain why non-democracies appear to grow faster than their democratic counterparts at low levels of national income. We do not test for this, but think it is a plausible conjecture.
Caveats and comments aside, we think that the evidence by and large supports our contention that political competition systematically effects how countries grow, rather than the rate at which they grow. Political competition promotes the more efficient use of human and material resources, but retards investment rates and perhaps labor supply. These cross-cutting 25 effects help explain why democracy itself may not have a systematic effect on growth rates, helping us understand the confusing empirical record.
26 14 We also test (but do not report here) for regional effects, using dummy variables for Europe, Latin America, North America, Asia, Africa. None of them substantially change the results obtained through fixed effects. 15 In several specifications the unit is US$ 1,000 in order to reduce the number of decimal places on the estimated coefficients. 16 An alternative measure of size would be area, but this variable is essentially constant for each country, precluding its use with fixed effects. 17 The most likely explanation for the discrepancy in coefficient size is that the variables change slowly within countries. In the yearly specification, more of the variance is captured by lags of the dependent variable. In the five-year specification, less of the variance is captured by lags of the dependent variable. 18 We reproduce the list of countries, years with the tables of results for each set of equations.
19 Simultaneity occurs when some of the regressors are endogenously determined, and hence correlated with the disturbance term. These effects need to be tested rather than assumed, especially when dealing with aggregate data.
20 Economic wisdom tells us that factor accumulation should lead to higher economic growth, leading to higher rather than lower levels of democracy. Thus investment could have feedback effects on political competition through wealth. Lipset (1959) , for example, argued that there is a strong correlation between economic development and the probability of being a democracy.
Similarly, Barro (1996) found that various conditions, such as per capital income, life expectancy and education, are good predictors of democracy. 21 We tried to assess whether causality could run in the opposite direction, namely from sources of growth to democracy. Though the structure of the data precludes an unambiguous conclusion, a battery of Granger causality tests within each country suggest that the direction of causality runs from political competition to the sources of growth, rather than the other way around. Note that these are tests of conditional independence (whether y predates x or vice versa), rather than proper proof of causality. 22 The coefficient on the residual is significantly different from zero in the augmented regressions, suggesting that we can reject the null hypothesis of no simultaneity. 23 For those cases where simultaneity did not appear to be a problem, we use OLS and correct the standard errors for panel effects, following Beck and Katz (1995) . 24 To further reduce the risk of contemporaneous correlation between the explanatory variables and the disturbance terms in the system, we lagged them one period, in which case they are instrumented by a second lag. In 26 The standard deviation for most countries falls between one and three, with a few countries as high as seven. 27 For secondary education, the standard deviation for individual countries varies considerably, from less than one in many cases to as large as 24 for Egypt. 28 It is worth noting that we tried a variety of specifications with trade. The results were quite inconsistent across specifications. Trade was typically negative but not significant with theoretically reasonable specifications.
